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A Holistic Strategy for Coming to
Grips with the Creeping Legalism of
Labor Arbitration
Stephen L. Hayford'
I. INTRODUCTION
Effective administration of the collective bargaining agreement is the heart
and soul of the relationship between American employers and unions. That
process works best when the parties resolve the controversies that arise during the
life of the collective bargaining agreement with a minimum of formality and with
as little involvement of outsiders as possible.
Recently, much concern has been expressed regarding what is perceived as a
trend toward unnecessarily burdening the labor arbitration forum with the manifold legal machinations more typical of traditional civil litigation. This article
proposes a straightforward solution to this widely perceived troubling direction of
the labor arbitration process, which attacks the phenomenon at its origin.
Lawyers and their legalistic ways are most often assigned the primary responsibility for encumbering and thereby weakening labor arbitration by failing to
recognize and take advantage of the many advantages offered by a forum that is
administered and brought to closure by a mutually selected, highly experienced
subject matter expert. This article asserts that however blameworthy some members of the labor relations bar may be in this regard, their presence and the arguably deleterious effect they can have on the labor arbitration mechanism is a mere
symptom of a more fundamental shortcoming of the contract administration
process in many bargaining relationships.
I submit that the increasingly cumbersome and confrontational nature of labor
arbitration can be successfully remedied only if employers and unions take responsibility for making the contractual grievance procedure an optimally effective
decision-making and problem-solving device intended to strengthen and cement
the bargaining relationship. I urge that arguments about the material facts and
harangues concerning whose interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
is correct in the labor arbitration forum, advanced by advocates endeavoring to
gain tactical advantage by reverting to familiar legal artifices, should be the very
last resort in the contract administration process.
My thirty-plus years of practice as a labor arbitrator and my long-time scholarly endeavors in the dispute resolution field convince me that labor arbitration
works best when it is viewed by employers and unions as a last resort, a fail-safe
device that signals their mutual failure to solve their own problems through the
contractual grievance procedure. Achieving a "win" in arbitration cannot be the
* Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Dr. Hayford is a member of the National Academy of Arbitrators and has practiced as a labor arbitrator since
1977. He is also a founder and past-President of the College of Commercial Arbitrators.
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goal of the contract administration process. The loss of control over outcomes and
process inherent in interjecting even a trusted, experienced outside arbitrator into
the day-to-day life of the workplace should cause management and union leaders
great pause.
The commentary that follows is a call to advocates to take back responsibility
for settling the disputes that arise during the life of the collective bargaining
agreement by becoming more adept negotiators, able and willing to find and engage the truth and unafraid to lead and make difficult decisions. Only then will
the legal machinations and contortions that increasingly plague labor arbitration
be rendered unnecessary in most circumstances. I assert that the "creeping legalism" of labor arbitration is a symptom of the too-frequent failure of the contractual grievance procedure to resolve difficult disputes. The conundrum that phenomenon presents can be ameliorated only if the parties mutually commit to attacking that underlying disease forthrightly and earnestly.
II. THE TRUE NATURE OF THE DILEMMA
The labor arbitration literature contains numerous articles lamenting what the
late Re Alleyne pithily dubbed the "lawyerizing" of the labor arbitration
process. In Professor Alleyne's view, by 1989 that phenomenon was responsible
for creating a "wide gap that often separates the simplicity of an arbitration issue
and the complexity of the hearing employed to resolve it." 2 The excessive legalism alarm was first sounded nearly sixty years ago, 3 and it has continued to echo
on a regular basis, notably increasing in the past two decades.
Among other factors, labor relations scholars and practitioners complain
about the increased costs for arbitrator and attorneys' fees,4 needlessly complex
rules of evidence, unwarranted delays in scheduling hearings and those associated
with the routine filing of post-hearing briefs, and the desire to insulate awards
from judicial vacatur.6 While there are only a few empirical studies concretely
confirming this perceived trend, it is the accepted wisdom that labor arbitration
has become more expensive, time consuming, and complex than necessary.
These obvious downsides to the trend toward increased legalism in labor arbitration are a cause for real concern. Often, they reflect an effort by the parties to
substitute aggressive advocacy for a good case on the merits, by inordinately encumbering the search for the truth that lies at the heart of the labor arbitration
process. I submit that when employer and union officials substitute aggressive
advocacy in the arbitration forum for effective negotiated decision-making in the
pre-arbitration steps of the grievance procedure, they abrogate their responsibilities to the people and organizations they represent.
1. Reginald Alleyne, DelawyerizingLabor Arbitration, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 93 (1989).
2. Id.
3. Edgar Warren & Irving Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
No. 2, 200 (1951).
4. Perry Zirkel and Andriy Krahmal, Creeping Legalism in Grievance Arbitration: Fact or Fiction?, 16 OHIO ST. J. DisP RESOL. 243, 244 (2001)
5. Alleyne, supra note 1, at 95-96.
6. Richard A. Posthuma & Maris Stella Swift, Legalistic vs. FacilitativeApproaches to Arbitration:
Strengths and Weaknesses, 52 LABOR L.J. 173, 176 (2005) (citing Joseph Raffaele, Lawyers in Labor
Arbitration,37 ARB. J. 14-23 (1982)).
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After several decades of work as a grievance mediator, I understand how politically difficult it can be for a union officer or business agent to look a grievant
in the eye and tell him that his behavior on the job constituted misconduct that
gave the employee just cause to terminate his employment. Similarly, it is no
small task for an employer's labor relations manager to speak the truth to a highlevel line executive regarding the latent ambiguity of a disputed contract provision
that could significantly hinder the efficiency of operations. Faced with the negative career ramifications of candidly communicating these often harsh realities to
their constituents, labor relations officials of both stripes too frequently kick the
problem up the hill and delegate the authority to decide the matter in dispute to an
arbitrator.
At first, this strategy of advancing difficult decisions that require the parties
to take risks and acknowledge and address the weaknesses in their respective positions to a third party who can then be blamed for bad outcomes can seem an attractive alternative. However, there is one very significant downside to that approach. It requires the principals in the grievance procedure to cede control over
important matters to outsiders who, no matter how objective and analytically
skilled they may be, can never hope to have the same depth and breadth of understanding of the impact those important decisions will have in the workplace-on
management and employees. The hope that aggressive advocacy in arbitration
will consistently produce results superior to those that can be achieved through a
vigorous effort at negotiated decision-making within the context of the contractual
grievance procedure is a fallacy.
The prospect of being stuck forever with an ill-advised, binding arbitration
award setting workplace policy by interpreting ambiguous contract language, or
deciding a disciplinary issue based on the limited inquiry permitted through a
"lawyerized" arbitration proceeding, should give even the most risk-averse management or union official pause. The unavoidable truth is that the persons assigned responsibility for making the grievance procedure an efficient problemsolving process that produces accurate (on the facts) and correct (on the contract)
results cannot shirk that responsibility by punting vexing contract interpretation
and discipline-related controversies to arbitration when it is not absolutely necessary to do so. 7
Leaders must lead. Decision-makers must make difficult decisions and solve
perplexing, high-stakes controversies. They cannot be debilitated by the fear of
incurring the ire of their constituents when the facts and the contract indicate that
those whose interests they represent have it wrong in either of those regards. Otherwise the model on which the contract administration process is founded falls
apart. I assert that this fact of labor relations life is the true key to ameliorating
the toxic effects of the creeping legalization phenomenon that is the subject of this
"Creeping Legalism" symposium, at which this paper was first presented. I will
now describe the model I propose as a solution to that conundrum.

7. An example of this dynamic in operation is the recent trend by mainline labor arbitrators, including the Author, toward retaining jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the implementation of the
remedy aspect of their awards, particularly in discipline cases where reinstatement of the grievant is
directed.
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Ul. ATrACKING THE DISEASE, NOT ITS SYMPTOMs
I am convinced that much of the failure of leadership and risk averse behavior
that results in employers and unions succumbing to the temptation in arbitration to
rely inordinately on the much-maligned tactics more typical of the traditional civil
justice system stems from a misperception of the purpose of the contractual grievance procedure. Properly conceptualized, the grievance procedure is viewed as a
problem-solving mechanism involving two parties to a de facto permanent relationship. In that scenario, the ongoing nature of the relationship between the parties results in great value being placed on candid communication, empathy, compromise, face saving, and other behaviors in which one engages when long-term
coexistence with another is required.
Making a long-term relationship work requires wise and thoughtful decisionmaking and adroit problem-solving. Sitting as I do at the final step of the contractual grievance procedure, I sometimes leave with the impression that the parties
have done neither of these. Instead, the evidence and the posture of the advocates
too often indicate the parties' behavior in the pre-arbitration steps of the grievance
procedure has centered almost exclusively on arguments about whose interpretation of the collective barfaining agreement is correct or consists of threat-based
efforts to exercise power. I do not have sufficient empirical data to ascertain the
origins of this apparent phenomenon. I do have some sense of how the underlying
dynamic can be shifted in a manner that can return the contractual grievance procedure to its true purpose, while doing much to vitiate the creeping legalism of
labor arbitration. I will now attempt to articulate and explicate my thesis.
The persons on the point in the contractual grievance procedure-4he union
and employer officials who call the shots-must be competent negotiators and
bold decision-makers. If they are not, they can never confidently take the types of
risks or deal with the palpable uncertainty required to settle difficult disputes short
of arbitration. Merely being an experienced negotiator does not make one a proficient negotiator. Instead, I am convinced that the real key to dispensing with the
need for the much-maligned legalistic machinations that are becoming more and
more common in labor arbitration is the mastery by management and union leaders of a set of process-based strategies for decision-making and dispute resolution
that are grounded in the negotiations process.
The decision-making strategies I describe, infra, focus on process and relationships, instead of results and winning. Thus, instead of immediately resorting
to arguments about whose version of the relevant facts is accurate or whose view
of the contract's proper application is correct, effective contract administrators
should focus diligently on the decision-making and problem-solving processes,
trusting that they will lead to mutually acceptable outcomes that satisfy the true
needs of the parties to the collective bargaining agreement.
Those advocates who have not mastered these negotiated decision-making
strategies find themselves with no alternative but to resort to contentious rightsbased arguments or attempts to wield their power in an effort to coerce the other
8. This view of the two alternatives to negotiated decision-making is most cogently articulated in
WILLIAM URY, JEANNE 1. BREr
& STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED:
DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COST OF CONFLICT 3-19 (1988).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2010/iss1/6

4

Hayford: Hayford: Holistic Strategy for Coming to Grips

No. 1]1

A Holistic Strategy

115

side into submission. Those rights and power-centered strategies for resolving the
disputes that arise during the life of the collective bargaining agreement can be
very destructive of the bargaining relationship. At the same time they can vitiate
the contract administration process by preventing a candid airing of the facts and
any form of interests-centered dialogue. It is not difficult to conceive how and
why those dysfunctional behaviors so often make resort to the legal machinations
that are the subject of this symposium inevitable.
Before turning to what I propose as the true antidote to the creeping legalism
phenomenon, I will devote a few paragraphs to describing what I see as the proper
balance between the pre-arbitration and arbitration steps of the contract administration process.
IV. THE PROPER INTERFACE BETWEEN LABOR ARBITRATION AND THE
PRE-ARBITRATION STEPS OF THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
The ultimate victory of the Braden model, which conceptualizes the labor arbitration process as an adjudicatory device and not a problem-solving mechanism,9 may have made the legalization of the process inevitable. At the same time,
the demise of George Taylor's view of labor arbitration as a problem-solving
process and the arbitrator as a shaper of the contract almost certainly has served
over time to diminish the importance attached to negotiated decision-making and
problem-solving in the pre-arbitration steps of the grievance procedure. This article is not a call for return to the Taylor model of labor arbitration. Instead, it is
an exhortation to employers and unions to revitalize the contractual grievance
procedure by clearly demarcating it from the adjudicatory process of the labor
arbitration forum and thereby regaining control of the contract administration
mechanism.
Contemporary labor arbitration is an almost exclusively adjudicatory process,
appropriately employed only when the parties have made a forthright and exhaustive effort to resolve a grievance in the contractual grievance procedure. Instead
of negotiated decision-making or problem-solving, the role of arbitration today is
to ensure a rigorous, arbitral search for the truth and a correct interpretation and
application of the relevant terms of the collective bargaining agreement, consistent
with the mutual intent of the parties. If labor arbitration is to serve its true proper
role, the parties' administration of the grievance procedure in its pre-arbitration
steps must promote a frank, pre-arbitration exploration of the truth of the matter at
issue and an honest evaluation of the parties' mutual intent in negotiating the relevant contact language.
If the parties do not make that happen, they allow too many questions of fact
and contract (or law), and application of contract (or law) to be decided by an
outsider. Ultimately, such decisions should be made by the union and employer
officials tasked with leading their respective constituents through the contract
administration process. I submit that labor arbitration works best when it is spa9. There are numerous thoughtful articles describing the origins, dynamics and outcome of the
classic debate between J. Noble Braden and George Taylor. See, e.g., Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I.
Abrams, The Labor Arbitrator'sSeveral Roles, 44 MD. L. REV. 873 (1985); Dennis Nolan, Labor and
Employment Arbitration: What's Justice Got to Do with It?, 53 Disp. RESOL. J. 40 (1998); George
Nicolau, The Future of LaborArbitration,51 DISP. RESOL. J. 75 (1996).
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ringly used; and when used, it has the least intrusive effect on the bargaining relationship and the day-to-day events of the workplace.
Effective negotiated decision-making and competent problem-solving in the
course of administering the collective bargaining agreement will resolve most
grievances, both the meritorious and non-meritorious ones. Even if negotiated
decision-making does not settle all grievances, it can, in most all situations, narrow and focus the search for the truth in arbitration and reduce the number of
issues or questions advanced to arbitration for resolution by an outsider.
Thus, I contend that the real key to ameliorating the much-decried intrusion
of legal machinations into the labor arbitration realm is found not in the arbitral
forum itself, but rather in the pre-arbitration steps of the grievance procedure. The
answer lies in making those pre-adjudicatory steps of the grievance procedure an
optimally efficient means for revealing the truth and fashioning outcomes the
parties can live with.
If that happens, it will dispel much of the perceived need for the jury trial tactics and related histrionic measures that have little place in the arbitral forum
where the trier of fact is an experienced neutral, savvy to the ways of the
workplace. By shifting the focus of the contract administration process to negotiated decision-making and problem-solving, and away from tests of strengths and
arguments about who is right, the parties will soon come to realize how dysfunctional and unnecessary the "lawyerizing" of labor arbitration is.
That is so because when an exhaustive, honest search for the truth has already
been made in the pre-arbitration steps of the grievance procedure, it is much harder to conceal the truth when the arbitrator is asked to decide the remaining questions of fact. Similarly, when in the grievance procedure, where the parties have
conscientiously endeavored to clarify their mutual intent underlying disputed contract language, it is much more difficult to distort it when the arbitrator is asked to
decide the remaining issues regarding that intent.
I will now turn to an explication of the two process-based strategies for negotiated decision-making and problem-solving that I believe are the true antidote for
creeping legalism that currently plagues labor arbitration. They are the very
processes that effective mediators facilitate when the parties chose to utilize
grievance mediation. Nevertheless, I am convinced that labor and management
advocates, who are willing to embrace and eventually master these skills sets, can
facilitate these processes without the aid of an outside neutral. As I describe the
elements of each process, try to envision how they can, if skillfully utilized by
properly motivated labor and management advocates, greatly increase the likelihood that grievances are resolved in the pre-arbitration steps of the contractual
grievance procedure, saving arbitration for the truly insoluble controversies where
resolution will legitimately require the intervention of a outside third party.
V. THE TWO PREREQUISITES TO A PARADIGM SHIFr
I believe much of the attractiveness and most of the overuse of traditional civil trial tactics in the labor arbitration venue results from a failure of the contractual
grievance procedure to fully engage the core inquiries and make the attendant,
often difficult decisions that are the key to resolving the controversies underlying
the grievance. In discipline cases, the critical contract administration task is accurately determining the facts regarding the grievant employee's alleged miscon-
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duct, the actions of management, past practice in similar misconduct cases, and
the like. Nevertheless, too often in the pre-arbitration steps of the grievance procedure, the parties are unable to get a clear read of those key facts. When the
grievance remains unresolved and is advanced to arbitration, the parties' hearing
behavior often seems centered on efforts to conceal or massage the truth rather
than reveal it.
In contract interpretation cases, the goal of the grievance procedure dialogue
is to discern and give effect to the mutual intent of the parties in negotiating the
disputed provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, clarifying latent ambiguities, and engaging and resolving patent ambiguities. When an issue arises that
was not contemplated by the parties when they negotiated the agreement, the parties are obliged to concede their omission and attempt to fashion a new decision or
rule that they both tolerate.
I aver that instead of effectively focusing their efforts in the pre-arbitration
steps of the grievance procedure on these matters, the parties too frequently focus
on their respective idiosyncratic views of the disputed contract language's meaning, advancing to arguments about what it arguably could mean. When these
contract interpretation cases proceed to arbitration, the parties many times fail to
understand that without probative, objective evidence of true mutual intent to
support their view of the contested contract language, their chances of winning are
minimal at best.
I maintain that the adjudicatory callisthenic of arbitration is best saved for the
controversies where the truth cannot be truly discovered, or where the mutual
intent of the parties accurately cannot be discerned. That its use is many times not
limited to those circumstances is evidence that the grievance procedure is not
working because the parties do not know how or chose not to do an effective job
of negotiating and problem-solving. The process-based strategies described below
should be the core activities of the pre-arbitration steps of the grievance procedure.

A. The FirstStep: Accurate Diagnosisof the Elements and Predominant
Characterof the Controversy
Not all grievances are the same. While virtually all contract administration
disputes will have both distributive (win-lose/zero sum) and integrative (winwin/variable sum) dimensions, every grievance will have a predominant character.
Correct assessment of a grievance's primary character will signal the likely nature
of the dialogue between the parties in the pre-arbitration steps of the grievance
procedure. Once that assessment is made, the parties can begin to comport their
behavior to the controversy before them.
The elements of a particular grievance where the parties' goals are in direct
conflict, or mutually exclusive, will be resolved through distributive bargaining, a
process that centers on the familiar quid pro quo, something-for-something, tradeoffs that typically characterize the negotiations that transpire between unions
and employers. When the parties are able to identify areas where their respective
goals are not in conflict, the potential exists to move the conversation into an integrative bargaining, problem-solving mode that offers tremendous potential for
mutual gain, but requires employers and unions to get out of the box and begin
thinking of the contract administration process in new ways.
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B. The Second Step: Rethinking the Grievance ProcedureDialogue
When a union and an employer agree to binding arbitration as the final step in
the contractual grievance procedure, they effectively set aside, or at least minimize, the effect of their relative power, as measured by tests of economic strength
like the strike and the lockout, for the duration of the collective bargaining agreement. In the place of power, the parties agree that any disputes concerning the
proper meaning and effect of the contract that are not brought to closure in the
grievance procedure will be adjudicated by a mutually selected outsider charged
with deciding who is right and who is wrong on the contract and the disputed
facts.
There are many circumstances where the parties can engage in a productive
discourse about whose version of the facts or whose interpretation of the contract
is correct within the context of the pre-arbitration steps of the grievance procedure, especially where the contract language is latently ambiguous or when the
facts cannot be objectively ascertained.'o However, more often than not, in both
contract interpretation and discipline cases, grievance procedure conversations
focused in this distributive bargaining manner quickly diminish into arguments
over which of the two mutually exclusive views of the facts or contract is correct.
When the parties find themselves unable to reconcile their conflicting perspectives, their positions harden and the dialogue effectively ends, no matter how
many grievance procedure steps remain to be traversed.
I assert that the grievance procedure works best, and the use of arbitration is
most effectively minimized, when the parties center their efforts in the grievance
procedure on the integrative bargaining process. The identification of mutual,
non-conflicting goals, the definition of the problems and obstacles preventing
achievement of those goals, and the shift of the dialogue to a conversation intended to reveal and serve the parties' respective interests, which are the hallmarks of integrative bargaining, have very little, if anything, to do with who is
right or more powerful. While integrative bargaining is not an antidote for all of
the ills currently plaguing the contract administration process, it is an essential
element of any meaningful effort to make the grievance procedure work.
The commentary that follows will describe in detail this refocusing of the
grievance procedure from a zero-sum argument about who is right, glossed by the
relative power of the parties and (at least implied) threats to use that power, to a
problem-solving effort centered on serving the parties' true needs and cultivating
and strengthening their relationship. I aver that employers and unions that learn
how to affect that shift from the distributive to the integrative mode of decisionmaking will both reduce the number of grievances unnecessarily advanced to
arbitration and help restore the simple elegance that is the hallmark of labor arbitration done right.
10. Thus, for example, within the context of a discipline case, union and management officials could
engage in a candid, forthright exploration of the facts attendant to a disciplinary matter, instead of
merely arguing about whose version of the facts is accurate. Similarly, when a latently ambiguous
contract provision pertaining to the payment of benefits comes into dispute, the parties could focus
their efforts on fashioning a new, innovative solution that would take effect during the term of collective bargaining agreement instead of arguing about which of their competing views of the current
contract provision is most defensible.
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VI. MASTERING THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATED DECISION-MAKING
As implied above, every conflict that begs to be resolved, every decision that
must be made within the context of a contractual grievance procedure (or elsewhere), requires the effectuation of two negotiated decision-making
processesistributive bargaining and integrative bargaining. The function of
distributive bargaining is to resolve the pure conflicts of interest between the parties, where their goals are mutually exclusive. The function of integrative bargaining is to identify the areas where the parties' goals are not in conflict, and to
fashion solutions to the problems and obstacles that are preventing achievement of
those mutual, non-conflicting goals. This section will describe the essential elements of each of the decision-making processes.
A. DistributiveBargainingConceptualized
When, in the course of attempting to settle an outstanding grievance, a union
and an employer find that their goals regarding certain aspects of the grievance are
in direct conflict, also described as mutually exclusive, those issues will be resolved through distributive bargaining. Distributive bargaining is a zero-sum
game wherein both parties are endeavoring to maximize their respective net gain.
The resources they are dealing with are fixed and limited (e.g., money, time, and
people), and their interaction centers on deciding how those scarce resources will
be allocated. There is no way to grow the pie, or create value, in distributive bargaining.
In Getting to Yes, Fisher and Ury refer to distributive bargaining as "positional bargaining" because the exchange of information between the parties is largely
limited to a conversation about their respective positions, with little consideration
of the interests, motivations, or real truths that underpin or relate to those positions.' The distributive bargaining dialogue typically starts with the parties framing their opening offers in a manner intended to anchor the negotiation over the
issues in a direction favorable to them by asking for substantially more or less
than they actually expect to achieve. They progress toward settlement (or not)
through a quid pro quo--centered movement toward some sort of viable bargaining range. If that series of tradeoffs does not place the positions of the parties in
reasonable proximity, the negotiation ends and the parties set a course for arbitration.
Despite the typical fixation on the opening offers and the outcomes the parties
want to achieve (their "target points"), the true gravamen of the decision-making
in distributive bargaining is the parties' respective resistance points, what they
need with regard to the issue at hand. In laying their a priori strategies in distributive bargaining, savvy negotiators endeavor to ascertain the other party's and their
own resistance points by objectively assessing (i) their respective outcome utilities
(their bottom line on an acceptable outcome on the merits of the issue); (ii) the
costs each attaches to an extended or difficult negotiation (their delay costs); and
(iii) the costs each would experience if the negotiation ended (their termination
I ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY,

GETING TO YES 3-10 (1983).
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costs). To a great extent, the parties' termination costs, and to a lesser extent,
their delay costs, are determined by the best alternative each has to a negotiated
agreement with the other (their "BATNAs").
One should never enter into a distributive negotiation without carefully assessing one's own and the other party's resistance points. Effective distributive
bargaining strategy must be firmly grounded in reality. Sophisticated negotiators
know that one of their key tasks is to manage the expectations of their team and
their constituents. Leaders who avoid this often-difficult task in order to build
enthusiasm and solidarity among their team members and constituents at the front
end of a negotiation betray their followers and lay the foundation for failure.
As you might guess, distributive bargaining tactics also center on their respective resistance points. At the bargaining table, the goal is always to move the
other party's resistance points on the distributive issues in a direction favorable to
you while you hold your ground as much as possible by competently deploying
four distinct tactical skills. 12
*

Assessing the other party's resistance point. Throughout the decision-making process, skilled negotiators will assess in real time the
desired outcome utilities, the delay costs, and the termination costs
of the other party. Based on that ongoing assessment of the other
party's resistance point, the negotiator adapts her a priori strategy to
fit that perceived new reality.
As Sun Tzu advises in The Art of War, the key to victory always lies
with the opponent. If you do not have a clear, constantly updated,
and refined picture of the other party's resistance points, you can
never make informed, bold decisions regarding the timing and nature
of concessions and other initiatives intended to stir your opponent into action. Instead, you will be merely guessing.

*

Managing the other party's perceptions. Skillful negotiators also
deliberately manage the other party's perceptions of their (the other
party's) outcome utilities, delay costs, and termination costs. This is
achieved by carefully fashioning all of your communications to the
other party, both verbal and nonverbal, and by mastering emotion so
as to not inadvertently divulge useful information to the counterparty.

*

Modifying the other party's resistance point. The third distributive
bargaining tactic involves modifying the other party's resistance
point determinants. Here, the task is to persuade the other party that
(i) they really could get by less or give more on the issue at hand; (ii)
they need to move quickly toward settlement; and (iii) their alternative(s) to a negotiated agreement with you (their BATNA(s)) are not
as attractive as they originally thought they were.

12. This distributive bargaining tactics template is based on a model described in ROY J. LEwICKI,
ET AL., NEGOTIATION (6th ed. 2009).
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Manipulating delay and termination costs. These manipulative tactics are best used sparingly. Thus, threats should be avoided, except
when absolutely necessary. Caution must also be exercised to speak
the truth. Gaining a reputation as a bully or prevaricator will not inure to your benefit over time.

All of these distributive bargaining tactics are concerned with the exchange of
information. We are talking here about the process of trying to nudge the other
party's shield down, to make it porous, so that he reveals information that enable
you to accurately divine his true resistance point. At the same time, you try to
keep your shield up, to remain inscrutable, revealing as little resistance-pointdeterminative information as possible, until it is to your advantage to do so in
pursuit of a settlement you can live with.
It is important to remember, however, that properly viewed within the context
of the essentially permanent bargaining relationship between an employer and a
representative union, the game of distributive bargaining does not result in either
side taking inordinate advantage of the other. Instead, it is a forthright process,
through which the parties explore and gradually reveal to one other their true resistance points-their respective bottom lines on each of the zero-sum issues that
they must decide if a grievance is to be resolved short of arbitration. Those zerosum issues can take many forms.
Thus, for example, in discipline cases, the search for the truth is often a distributive issue. At the outset of their grievance procedure dialogue, the parties
often strongly disagree as to the actual nature of the grievant's actions or the disciplinary past practice in similar cases. If settlement is to be achieved, both of the
parties likely will have to adjust, either explicitly or tacitly, what they are willing
to acknowledge as those material facts. In discharge cases, decisions regarding
the terms of a possible reinstatement, like back pay, benefits, and reinstatement to
a position filled by another employee, require the same type of distributive bargaining.
In contract interpretation cases, the search for the truth typically focuses on
divining the parties' mutual intent in negotiating disputed contract language equiring a candid exchange regarding bargaining history and relevant
past practice. Similarly, the decision whether to stick with the ambiguous current
language or take the risk of offering a clarification of the provision presents risks
that can be viewed as distributive.
For sure, the exchange of information underpinning distributive bargaining is
guarded and restrained, especially at the outset. Nevertheless, the dialogue necessary to achieve satisfactory resolution obliges the parties to fashion their messages
with the objective of ensuring that they get through to the other party intact with a
minimum of distortion, to listen actively, and to elicit and provide feedback to
ensure that result.
Employers and the unions certified as the representatives of their employees
are highly interdependent. Their relationship is for all intents and purposes a permanent one. Their interdependency is contrient with regard to the distributive
issues that arise during the contract administration process, in that each aspires to
maximize their respective net gain, placing their respective goals in direct conflict.
But they are still interdependent in that neither can achieve its goals, in whole or
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in part, without the cooperation of the other. The quid pro quo and compromise
that lie at the heart of proficient distributive bargaining do not occur because the
parties want to make those difficult tradeoffs. They transpire because the parties
eventually learn that compromise is better than not reaching an agreement whose
terms they control, and because they value and wish to nurture the relationship
between them.
While an essential dimension of decision-making within the context of a contractual grievance procedure, in most circumstances, distributive bargaining alone
is not sufficient to produce the kind of movement and creative thinking necessary
to resolve difficult grievances. If the parties remain stuck in the something-forsomething mode, it eventually becomes very difficult for them to move past their
target points to their true resistance points where settlement invariably resides in
negotiations between co-equals. Instead, they begin to pull back and blame the
other party for the failure of the process, often projecting their own obdurate attitude onto the other party. The parties retreat, their positions harden, and they
begin to shield their resistance points. Inevitably, the communication channel is
hobbled by increasing distortion, and the feedback loop essential to effective problem-solving shuts down as the parties increasingly talk at and past one another,
instead of with each other.
I am convinced that the key to breaking the logjam that is invariably produced
by reliance on distributive bargaining as the sole device for resolving disputes
submitted through the course of the contractual is effecting a transition to an integrative bargaining-problem-solving mode of information exchange. How the
parties to the grievance procedure can affect that shift and make the most of this
second negotiated decision-making process is the subject of the commentary,

infra.
B. Integrative BargainingConceptualized
The trigger to integrative bargaining is the shared realization that the employer and the union have goals that are not in conflict. These mutual, non-conflicting
goals can be present even though their achievement does not produce equal benefits for both, and even if the parties have different objectives. The identification
of common goals (same objective-equal benefits), shared goals (same objective-unequal benefits), and joint goals (different objectives-a cooperative effort) signals that the dialogue between the union and the employer can and should
shift from the win-lose, zero-sum distributive bargaining to a problem-solving
focus.
Where parties are addressing matters where their goals are not in conflict, the
interaction of the parties in integrative bargaining is substantially different in tone
and content from that typical of distributive bargaining. Because they are playing
a variable-sum/mixed-sum game intended to solve mutual problems and not arguing about who is right or attempting to coerce the other party into submission,
unions and employers that master the integrative problem-solving process are
much more likely to get out of the box and find unique solutions to difficult disputes that typically must be delegated to an outside arbitrator for decision.
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In Getting to Yes, Fisher and Ury refer to integrative bargaining as interestsbased bargaining.13 That is so because the success of the process turns largely on
the parties' ability to reciprocally lower the shields behind which they conceal
their resistance points in distributive bargaining in order to reveal and explore the
things that really matter to them regarding the issues at hand. In doing so, a union
and employer skilled at integrative bargaining will candidly discuss the following
matters:14
*

Substantive interests, which concern the actual issues on the table
and are what they consider to be acceptable outcomes on those issues.

*

Process interests, which relate to the manner in which the parties
view the particular dispute, the reasons why they are negotiating in
an effort to resolve it, and their predispositions about the ways in
which conflict should be resolved within the context of the contractual grievance procedure.

*

Relationship interests, which go to the extent to which the employer
and the union value the relationship between them and their respective desires to avoid damaging while instead strengthening that relationship.

*

Principles-based interests, which go to the parties' beliefs about
what is fair, what is right, and what is acceptable.

Instead of endeavoring to remain inscrutable and conceal their bottom lines as
to possible solutions to the problems at hand, the parties in integrative bargaining
center their dialogue on working toward solutions that serve their interests as well
as the interests of the other party.
The less confrontational nature of the integrative bargaining process notwithstanding, it is important to remember that the relationship between the parties
remains an adversarial one. Thus, even though the union and the employer are
working toward mutual, non-conflicting goals, their interests are not identical and
cooperation is not guaranteed. For the conversation in the grievance procedure to
shift to a problem-solving mode, the parties must earn one another's trust.
In order for the more open communication and willingness to take risks essential to effective integrative bargaining to transpire the parties do not come to
trust one another. The several conditions precedent to trust building provide useful guides to advocate behavior:
First, the parties must objectively and thoughtfully determine their
positions on the issues and remain firmly committed to them until it
is time to compromise. Experience shows that the other party will
13. FISHER & URY, supra note I1, at 41-57.

14. This integrative bargaining construct is founded on a model described in ROY J. LEWICKI, ET AL.,
NEGOTIATION (6th ed. 2009).
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not take you seriously and will not make the difficult decisions necessary to resolve tough disputes if they do not believe you mean
what you say. Thus, you must avoid hedging your position, or repositioning without explaining why.
*

The parties must exhibit mutual patience and support during the
course of the problem-solving process. You cannot expect the other
party to take risks, or to leave their comfort zone, if you are unwilling to invest the time it takes to build consensus among their constituents or allow them to save face when they are obliged to change
their position on an issue or back out of a commitment.

*

The best way to elicit cooperative, trusting behavior from the other
party is to be willing to initiate it, by demonstrating your willingness
to trust the other party and to cooperate with them by taking the other party at its word, or by making that first concession without linking that concession to a demand for reciprocation.

*

It is important to share as much information as possible. The goal
here is to use information exchanges to maximize the common pool
of information and thereby increase the ability of the union and the
employer to achieve their common, shared, and joint goals.

*

Building trust also requires employer and union representatives to
exercise care to ensure that, during their grievance procedure interactions, each communicates its needs and priorities clearly, with a minimum of ambiguity. They must use language that describes reality
and communicate in clear, straightforward terms.

*

Finally, it is essential that the parties demonstrate their willingness to
accept that the other party's positions are both sincerely held and
based upon valid considerations (in terms of the other party's frame
of reference). Here we speak of legitimating the other party by refraining from challenges to the rationality or wisdom of their positions.

The trust essential to centering the contractual grievance procedure on integrative problem-solving is built over time, through a pattern of consistent behavior
whereby union and employer representatives demonstrate to one another that they
can afford to take the risks inherent in lowering the shields that normally obscure
their true priorities and motives.
Several behaviors are key to effecting this shift from the typical cautious and
defensive mode of information exchange that characterizes distributive bargaining
to the more open, candid interaction between the parties required in integrative
bargaining. First, the employer and union must empathize with each other's perspective on the issues at hand, the relationship between them, and the possible
obstacles to more cooperative behavior they each face. My thirty years of experience as a grievance mediator has revealed scant evidence of a willingness by the
parties to adopt this mindful approach to the contract administration process.
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Contrary to the oft-displayed conventional wisdom, empathy is not a sign of
weakness. It requires courage and true leadership to demonstrate a willingness to
step into the other party's shoes and try to gain an accurate and complete picture
of its view of the controversy at hand. Thus, once an employer representative
gains a clear picture of the union's political problems in acknowledging that a
discharged grievant in fact engaged in the charged misconduct, she can move the
dialogue to a discussion of the possible outcomes, short of termination, that could
result if the factual dispute is set aside. Of course, there can never be a guarantee
that this tactic will work, but it does at least clear the way for a problem-solving
effort that is impossible if the core subject matter of the parties' exchange in the
grievance procedure remains on the "you say/we say" fact-centered dynamic.
The second behavior critical to the integrative problem-solving process in the
contractual grievance procedure is maintaining a focus on the problems that are
preventing the parties from achieving their common, shared, and joint goals. It
requires strong discipline for a union and employer representative engaged in a
problem-solving effort to avoid straying back to the win/lose distributive elements
of the underlying controversy. Thus, when discussing the possibility of unique
solutions in a termination case (e.g., front pay in lieu of reinstatement) or a contract interpretation case (e.g., a supplemental letter of agreement intended to resolve a latent ambiguity in the disputed language of the collective bargaining
agreement), the parties must resist the temptation to return to the zero-sum issues
involving money and similar fixed resources matters, or arguments about whose
version of the facts is correct.
Finally, the union and the employer must come to view the problem-solving
dimensions of their grievance procedure dialogue as a search for solutions that
will lead to achievement of their mutual, non-conflicting goals. The seminal activity in that search must be a robust and candid exploration of the parties' respective interests that underpin their positions on the issues at play. Common, shared,
and joint goals are achieved if the parties ensure that their interests and the interests of the respective constituents are adequately served by the outcomes they
devise in the contractual grievance procedure.
Unions and employer labor relations officials who master integrative bargaining will direct the contract administration process away from an exclusive focus
on power-centered arguments about whose version of the facts and whose interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is right. When the grievance
procedure conversation remains mired in that conundrum, the parties greatly reduce the chances that they will successfully resolve grievances short of the arbitration terminus of the contract administration process. It is when that opportunity
for fashioning mutually acceptable outcomes is squandered that the parties often
feel compelled to pull out all of the stops in arbitration in order to prevail in what
is often a winner-take-all contest. That is a most unfortunate, unnecessary, and
highly dysfunctional outcome.

VII. Two CURRENT EXAMPLES OF A PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH TO
THE CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION PROCESS
Making the contract administration process work requires mastery of both
distributive and integrative bargaining, paired with the ability to accurately diagnose which issues pertinent to a particular grievance are appropriate for resolution
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through each of those negotiated decision-making processes. Effective utilization
of these two skill sets also requires the negotiation effort to be founded on an accurate and complete assessment of the facts and attendant circumstances presented
by a given grievance.
My many years of experience mediating grievances and serving as the neutral
in several other alternative dispute resolution forums utilizing a methodology
based on the negotiated decision-making paradigm previously described, convinces me that unions and employers can learn and successfully implement the
decision-making, problem-solving strategy previously described. I have also seen
it work effectively in two hybrid, neutral-driven processes, one dictated by federal
law and a second created by the parties out of frustration with a traditional model
of contract administration that resulted in far too many contractual disputes being
advanced to arbitration.
The first mechanism is the System Board of Adjustment device mandated by
the Railway Labor Act in the airline industry.' 5 Ironically this approach to resolving contractual disputes results in the serious problem-solving taking place within
the context of grievance arbitration, at the post-hearing stage. When the System
Board of Adjustment mechanism works properly, the neutral chair's decision of
the issue before her is informed by one or more off-the-record, pre-award executive sessions with the management and union System Board members.
The purpose of the post-hearing executive sessions is not to re-argue the parties' cases-in-chief. Instead, if done correctly, those conversations give the advocate board members an opportunity to clarify the interests underlying the positions
of their respective constituents in an informal venue. It also provides the neutral
chair with a unique opening to ask questions that he would be ill-advised to raise
in the hearing for fear of interfering with the advocacy dynamic on which the
hearing and the arbitration process itself is based. Most importantly, I have found
that the executive board executive session also enables the neutral chair to tailor
remedies in a manner that greatly enhances the likelihood that the award will be
successfully executed with a minimum of the post-award implementation snafus
that have led to the increasing tendency of arbitrators to retain jurisdiction.' 6
The second hybrid mechanism I have worked with is a pre-arbitration process
created by AT&T, the Communication Workers, and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers for use in discharge cases. The parties have dubbed
this alternative approach Early Neutral Evaluation. While it does involve direct
insertion of the neutral into the negotiated decision-making process, the Early
Neutral Evaluation procedure has proven to be an effective means for accelerating
the truth-finding and reality-checking dynamics that are essential to settling difficult discipline cases.
Remarkably, this entire process takes no more than ninety to 120 minutes to
complete. It begins with the company and the union each taking thirty minutes to
articulate their cases in support of and in opposition to the challenged discharge.
Each party is permitted to call one person with knowledge of the events at issue to
provide a narrative description of their version of the disputed facts. The neutral
15. See 45 U.S.C. § 153 (2006).
16. The retention of jurisdiction device, while often necessary, frequently results in a second level of
dysfunctional "lawyerizing" of what should be a simple, elegant dispute resolution technique.
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evaluator is permitted to ask questions, but there is no cross examination. Thereafter, the neutral evaluator has thirty minutes to appraise the facts and consider the
parties' arguments.
When the process is brought to conclusion, the neutral evaluator offers his assessment of the disputed facts and the likely outcome if the grievance before him
is advanced to arbitration. I always make it clear to the parties that while I will
explain my findings, I will not defend them or entertain any attempts at rebuttal.
The parties then have ten days to notify their counterpart that they reject the neutral evaluator's findings. If they do not, those findings become binding and are
adopted in resolution of the grievance.
At times during the course of delivering my evaluation of a particular case, I
will endeavor to smooth the way to effective implementation of a reinstatement
order, or to facilitate face saving for the grievant when her discharge is upheld. I
am convinced that this interest-based dialogue is due in part to my many years of
service with the parties-I am not aware of any case where my findings as to the
ultimate outcome were rejected. It appears that virtually all of the termination
cases submitted to the Early Neutral Evaluation process are settled without resort
to arbitration.
VIII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
I am confident that, if asked, most experienced union and management representatives would aver they are knowledgeable, skilled negotiators. I am not certain that is true.
The fact is very few line managers, labor relations officials, union stewards,
or union business representatives have had the benefit of intensive, extended training in the body of knowledge and the attendant skills critical to mastering the art
of effective negotiated decision-making. I would speculate that, if asked, they
could not concretely articulate the processes they follow in attempting to resolve
grievances in the contractual grievance procedure; could not describe the patterns
of behavior that lead to settlement or result in non-settlement of grievances; or
could not define the strategies they pursue in the course of discharging their contract administration responsibilities.
Effective contract administration requires disciplined decision-making and
courageous, thoughtful leadership. That cannot happen without mastery of the
process-based strategies for negotiated decision-making described, supra. It is the
only way employer and union representatives can maximize the control they wield
over processes and outcomes in the contractual grievance procedure, thereby minimizing the need for resort to the histrionics and machinations associated with
the excessive legalism of labor arbitration.
It is undeniable that there is risk associated with the proactive approach that I
advocate. However, in light of the element of arbitral principle that bars admission of any evidence pertaining to settlement negotiations in the grievance procedure, that risk is minimal. The safe harbor of arbitration will not be contaminated
by the strategy I suggest.
I realize that by appearing to admonish union and employer advocates for a
failure to lead, and by championing an approach that could greatly diminish the
number of grievances that are advanced to arbitration, I run the risk of being
"Borked" for my comments by advocates and arbitrators alike. However, I am
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convinced that my views represent the best way to minimize the distortion of the
arbitration process to which I devote so my much of effort and passion-and that
is a risk I am willing to take.
I believe in the labor arbitration process. I have devoted much of my professional life to practicing this honorable craft. Done correctly, it is the best way for
employers and unions to bring closure to the disputes that arise during the life of
the collective bargaining agreement that they are unable to decide on their own.
Nevertheless, I cannot stand by and watch the process I love and believe in be
debilitated and diminished by the premature and often unnecessary resort to the
tactics and mindset that govern traditional civil litigation.
At the least, my thoughts here are a plea to employer and union advocates
alike to regain control of the contract administration process by becoming more
adept at negotiated decision-making and by exercising their respective leadership
roles in a more audacious, mindful way. If they are to pick up the gauntlet that I
throw down, I am convinced that most of the disconcerting outfalls of creeping
legalism in labor arbitration would be greatly diminished. It is my sincere hope
that they do.
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